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when they are awarded, they most 
often serve as a statutorily-imposed 
punitive measure, the need to in-
clude them in compensatory dam-
ages diminishes. Under this view, 
attorney's fees would seem to be an 
appropriate consideration in mea-
suring an award of punitive dam-
ages. 
[d at 350-51,568 A2d at 4l. 
The court was equally unimpressed by 
the argument that jury discretion would 
be affected. To the contrary, the court 
saw it as an opportunity to provide 
needed guidance to the jury. Citing 
Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco 
Disposa4 Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989), it 
pointed to the Supreme Court's concern 
over the lack of direction provided to 
juries in measuring the amount of puni-
tive damages. st. Luke Church, 318 Md. 
at 351-52, 568A.2d at 42. The amount of 
a prevailing party's legal fees would fur-
nish a degree of guidance to the jury not 
previously provided. [d. 
The court looked at the approaches 
taken by certain states which allow con-
sideration of attorney'S fees in the award 
of punitive damages. It rejected the Con-
necticut approach which limits the 
award of punitive damages to the amount 
of attorney's fees incurred by the prevail-
ingparty.Id at 352-53, 568A2dat42-43. 
Rather, the court agreed with the Kansas 
approach where the amount of 
attorney's fees is merely one objective 
factor for the jury to consider. Id 
Thus, the court of appeals reversed the 
court of special appeals and reinstated 
the jury's punitive damage award. The 
decision satisfied two of the court's 
goals. By presenting the jury with evi-
dence of a prevailing claimant's 
attorney's fees, the jury is provided with 
helpful guidance in measuring an award 
of punitive damages as well as a meaning-
ful way to punish the wrongdoer for 
flagrant misconduct. 
-John A. Nolet 
F.T.C v. Superior Court Trial Law-
yers Ass'n: A BOYC01T BY A GROUP 
OF lAWYERS CONSTI1UfED AN 
AGREEMENf TO FIX PRICES IN 
VIOlATION OF TIlE ANTITRUST 
STA1UfES 
In F. T. C v. Superior Court Trial Law-
yers Association, 110 S. Ct. 768 (1990), 
the Supreme Court held that an agree-
ment among a group of trial lawyers to 
refuse representation of indigent crimi-
nal defendants until the government in-
creased their compensation amounted to 
price-fIXing. The Court reasoned that the 
expressive component of such a boycott 
was not protected by the fmt amend-
ment and did not create an exception to 
the antitrust statutes. As a result, the 
price-fIXing agreement was held to be a 
per se violation of section 1 of the Sher-
man Act and section 5 of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act. 
Pursuant to the District of Columbia's 
Criminal Justice Act (ClA) , lawyers in 
private practice were appointed and 
compensated to represent indigent de-
fendants in various criminal cases. With 
the majority of appointments going to a 
group of about 100 lawyers referred to as 
"CJA regulars. " These cases represented 
approximately 85% of the total caseload 
in the District. "After 1970, the Criminal 
Justice Act set fees at $30 per hour for 
court time and $20 per hour for out-of-
court time, and despite a 147 percent 
increase in the consumer price index, 
compensation remained at those levels 
until the boycott" occurred. Id. at 786 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
In 1982, the respondents, Superior 
Court Trial Lawyers Association 
(SCTIA) , unsuccessfully attempted to 
persuade the District to raise rates. As a 
result, in 1983, the SCTIA members met 
and agreed not to accept any new cases 
after September 6, 1983, unless legisla-
tion was passed providing for an increase 
in rates. When the legislation was not 
passed, 90% of the SCTIA members re-
fused to accept new assignments. 
The boycott had a severe impact on 
the District's criminal justice system. 
Within days, the District's government 
offered the SCTIA a temporary increase 
to $35 per hour with a permanent in-
crease to $45 per hour for out-of-court 
time and $55 per hour for court time. The 
SCTIA accepted the offer and ended the 
boycott. 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 
however, filed a complaint against the 
SCTIA alleging that the agreement was a 
restraint of trade and characterized the 
SCTIA's conduct as a conspiracy to fIX 
prices. The complaint was heard before 
an administrative law judge (AL]) who 
recognized the violation of the antitrust 
laws, but dismissed the complaint be-
cause the increased fees would have a 
beneficial effect. The increased fees 
would attract new CJA lawyers and allow 
the current CJA lawyers to reduce their 
caseload in order to provide better rep-
resentation.Id. at 773. 
The FTC disagreed, asserting that as a 
result of the boycott, the city would 
spend an additional 4 to 5 million dollars 
a year for the same legal services. [d. 
Accordingly, the FTC filed a cease-and-
desist order to prevent the SCTIA from 
initiating a similar boycott in the future. 
[d. 
The court of appeals found that the 
SCTIA boycott contained elements of 
expression warranting first amendment 
protection. Therefore, a restriction on 
this form of expression could not be 
justified unless the restriction was no 
greater than what was necessary to pro-
tect an important governmental right. Id. 
at 774 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 
391 U.S. 367 (1968». The court con-
cluded that the O'Brien test could not be 
satisfied by the application of an other-
wise appropriate per se rule of antitrust 
law, but instead required the enforce-
ment agency to prove, rather than pre-
sume, that the Sherman Act was violated. 
[d. (citing Superior Court Trial Lawyers 
Ass'n v. F. T. C, 856 F.2d 226,248-50 (D.c. 
Cir. 1988». The court of appeals, there-
fore, vacated the cease-and-desist order 
and remanded the case for a determina-
tion of whether the SCTIA actually pos-
sessed "Significant market power," 
which would justify the restriction of 
their first amendment rights. 
The Supreme Court reversed, con-
cluding that the SCTIA's boycott was per 
se violative of section 1 of the Sherman 
Act and section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act. F.T.C, 110S.Ct.at774. 
As the FTC, the ALJ, and-the court of 
appeals all agreed, the SCTIA's boycott 
constituted a classic restraint of trade 
within the meaning of section 1 of the 
Sherman Act. Id. The Court rejected the 
boycott's social justifications, as well the 
SCTIA's objective in bringing about fa-
vorable legislation. Id. at 776. In addition, 
the Court reasoned that because the 
SCTIA's objective was to gain an eco-
nomic advantage for those participating 
in the boycott, the conduct was not pro-
tected by the first amendment. Id. at 778. 
The Court pointed out that constitutional 
protection does not apply "to a boycott 
conducted by business competitors who 
stand to profit financially from a lessen-
ing of competition in the boycotted mar-
ket." Id. at 777 (quoting Allied Tube & 
Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 
u.s. 492, 508 (1988». 
The Court then considered whether 
the court of appeals was correct in creat-
ing a new exception to the per se rules 
of antitrust liability. The court of appeals 
relied on United States v. O'Brien, 391 
u.s. 367 (1968). O'Brien violated a fed-
eral statute when he burned his Selective 
Service registration certificate on the 
steps of a Boston courthouse. In affirm-
ing his conviction, the Court concluded 
that the statute's inCidental restriction on 
O'Brien's freedom of expression was no 
greater than necessary to further the 
government's interest in requiring regis-
trants to have valid certificates continu-
ally available. F.T.G., 110 S. Ct. at 778. In 
light of O'Brien, the court of appeals held 
that the expressive component of the 
SCTIA's boycott compelled the "courts 
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to apply the antitrust laws 'prudently and 
with sensitivity,' with a 'special solici-
tude for the First Amendment rights' of 
[the SCfLA)." Id. (quoting Superior 
Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n. v. F. T. C, 856 
F.2d at 233-34). Thus, the court of ap-
peals shifted the burden to the FfC to 
show that the boycotters possessed suf-
ficient market power to warrant a per se 
violation of the antitrust laws. 
The Supreme Court, however, found 
the court of appeals' analysis to have 
been critically flawed in two respects. 
First, the court of appeals exaggerated 
the significance of the expressive com-
ponent in the SCfLA's boycott. The 
Court found nothing unique about the 
expressive component of the SCfLA boy-
cott. Rather, a rule that would require the 
courts to apply the antitrust laws with 
prudence and sensitivity whenever a 
boycott had an expressive component 
"would create a gaping hole in the fabric 
of those laws." Id. at 780. 
Second, the Court found that the court 
of appeals was incorrect in their assess-
ment of the antitrust laws. Id. at 779. The 
Court criticized the court of appeals' as-
sumption that the per se rule against 
price-fIXing and boycotts "is only a rule 
of 'administrative convenience and effi-
ciency,' and not a statutory command." 
Id. at 780. While the Court conceded that 
the per se rules of liability were in part 
justified by administrative convenience, 
the per se rules "reflect a long-standing 
judgment that the prohibited practices 
by their nature have a 'substantial poten-
tial for impact on competition.'" Id. 
(quotingjefferson Parish Hospital Dis-
trictNo.2v.Hyde, 466 U.S. 2,16(1984)). 
As Justice Douglas stated in a footnote to 
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 
310 U.S. 150 (1940), "whatever eco-
nomic justifications particular price-fix-
ing agreements may be thought to have, 
the law does not permit an inquiry into 
their reasonableness. They are all banned 
because of their actual or potential threat 
to the central nervous system of the econ-
omy." F. T. C 110 S. Ct. at 781-82 (quoting 
Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 225-26. 
The Court also conceded that some 
boycotts and some price-fIXing agree-
ments were more injurious to competi-
tion than others, but held that the court 
of appeals' assumption that absent proof 
of market power the SCfLA boycott was 
harmless, was inconsistent with the 
course of the Supreme Court's antitrust 
jurisprudence.Id. at782. Here, there was 
sufficient testimony to demonstrate that 
the boycott produced a crisis in the 
District's criminal justice system which 
achieved the SCfLA's economic goal. 
Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the 
court of appeals' decision creating an 
exception to the per se rules of antitrust 
liability. Id. 
The impact of this decision is substan-
tial. Previously, the notion of a boycott 
had been an agreement among the par-
ticipants to refrain from engaging in cer-
tain activities in order to bring about a 
change. It was thought that this type of 
agreement was protected by the first 
amendment because it was a form of 
expression. Now, if such an agreement 
has the objective of bringing about an 
economic benefit to the participants, the 
courts must characterize the agreement 
as a restraint of trade. The courts are then 
required to apply the per se rules of 
antitrust liability to the agreement and 
find it violative of both the Sherman Act 
and the Federal Trade Commission Act. 
-Thomas J S. Waxter, III 
Needle v. White, Minde~ Clark & HiU: 
TRIAL COURT'S DEOSION TO 
SANCITON REVERSED AS CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS 
In Needle v. White, Minde4 Clarke & 
Hill, 81 Md. App. 463, 568 A.2d 856 
(1990), the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland held that the trial court's deci-
sion to impose over $143,000 in sanc-
tions, pursuant to Maryland Rule 1-341, 
was clearly erroneous. After reviewing all 
the evidence in the underlying suit, the 
court held that neither of the plaintiff's 
attorneys, nor their client, lacked the 
substantial justification required to bring 
suit, nor had they brought the suit in bad 
faith. An attorney need only bring forth a 
colorable claim to avoid the imposition 
of sanctions, while a court cannot use the 
benefit of hindsight to determine the 
claim's merits. 
After a thirteen-year term of employ-
ment, Carolyn Gerst was amicably termi-
nated from her position as a bookkeeper 
for the law firm of White , Mindel, Clarke 
and Hill. According to the firm, Gerst was 
discharged simply because a replace-
ment could do a better job. Yet her em-
ployers subsequently discovered, among 
other discrepancies, that approximately 
$203,000 had been withdrawn from one 
of the firm's accounts, coinciding with 
Gerst's fmal year of employment. Thus, 
the firm instructed John Foley, a member 
of the firm, to file a claim for reimburse-
ment with the insurance company with 
whom they maintained a $100,000 em-
ployee fidelity policy. The claim asserted 
that the loss resulted from dishonest or 
fraudulent acts by Gerst. Additionally, a 
complaint against Gerst was filed with 
the police, satisfying a condition of recov-
ery under the policy. The full $100,000 
was eventually remitted to the firm, 
while Gerst was charged with embezzle-
ment. 
At her criminal trial, Gerst alleged that 
she withdrew the cash at the request of 
Samuel Hill, a partner in the firm, and 
then turned the money over to him. This 
conflicted with Hill's testimony that 
withdrawals from the account were al-
lowed by internal paper transfer only, 
and denied ever authorizing cash with-
drawals or receiving any cash from Gerst. 
After a three-day jury trial, Gerst was 
acquitted. 
Thereafter, Gerst retained Howard J. 
Needle and Sarah C. King for an initial 
counsel fee, with additional fees on a 
contingency fee basis. A suit was subse-
quently initiated against White, Mindel, 
Clarke and Hill, as well as Hill and Foley 
personally, for, Ultimately, malicious 
prosecution and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. At the extensive hear-
ing on the defendant'S pre-trial motion 
for summary judgment, Gerst asserted 
that the initiation of criminal charges by 
the firm was motivated solely by the 
firm's efforts to collect on its employee 
fidelity insurance policy, and resulted in 
her emotional distress. Conversely, the 
defendants argued that Gerst instituted 
her civil action as retaliation for the crim-
inal charges filed against her. The motion 
was denied. 
The case proceeded to trial where the 
issues were whether the law firm insti-
tuted a criminal proceeding against Gerst 
without probable cause for a purpose 
other than bringing an offender to jus-
tice, and whether, as a result, Gerst suf-
fered emotional distress. Needle, 81 Md. 
App. 467, 568 A.2d at 858. Conflicting 
testimony was heard on the procedure of 
cash withdrawals and the ultimate desti-
nation of the funds in question. Defen-
dants renewed their motion for summary 
judgment at the close of Gerst's case and 
again at the conclusion of all the evi-
dence. The trial court denied the former 
and reserved ruling on the latter. 
The issues, including whether Gerst 
stole money from the defendants, were 
submitted to the jury. The jury decided 
that the defendants had a reasonable be-
lief that Gerst took the money and that 
they did not report the matter to the 
police with ill will or with a reckless 
disregard for the truth. Additionally, the 
jury found that Gerst suffered emotional 
distress due to the filing of the police 
report, but that it was not severe, and that 
Gerst did not steal the money. Id. at 468, 
568 A.2d at 858. Thus, a judgment was 
entered for the defendants. 
Immediately following the verdict, the 
court, sua sponte, scheduled a sanctions 
hearing on the issue of Maryland Rule 
1-341, Bad Faith - Unjustified Proceed-
ings. Id. Although having only allowed 
three business days in between, the court 
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